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In different treatments of an intergenerational common resource experiment, monetary payoff maximization by each
generation causes either negative or positive externalities for future generations. Two behavioral types have been
observed previously in single generation games: equity motivated individuals enjoy giving to the needy and taking
from (not giving to) the prosperous, while warm glow altruists enjoy giving unconditionally. In the examined
intergenerational game, observed behavior is not consistent with the equity motive. Roughly half of the subjects
maximize own monetary payoffs, while the others exhibit altruistic behavior consistent with a model of warm glow
giving with constant altruistic sacrifices across treatments.
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HPMF-CT-199-00312 is gratefully acknowledged.1) Intergenerational equity is very close to the notion of “sustainable development” that has gained major political
impact (e.g. United Nations Agenda 21 “Sustainable Development” at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda21.htm.)
The  Brundtland  Report,  “Our  Common  Future”,  (United  Nation's  World  Commision  on  Environmental  and
Development 1987) defines “sustainable development” as “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
2) An especially troubling consequence of this norm is that the current generation must refrain from making any
costly long-term investments (e.g. basic research) in growing economies. Since in growing economies, the current
generation is always the poorest, investments that pay back only to future generations in fact increase inequality.
Hartwick (1977), however, has shown that long-term investments can be consistent with intergenerational equality,
when the positive externality of today’s investments for future generations is offset by the negative externality of
today’s exploitation of exhaustible resources.
1
“We can do something for posterity, but it can do nothing for us.” (Rawls 1971)
1. Introduction
Decisions taken by the generation of people living today can have significant positive or negative
economic consequences for the generations to come. On the one hand, our generation may invest
in the development of new technologies that improve the quality of life or increase productivity
for all future generations. On the other hand, some of our activities, such as the exploitation of
natural resources, may decrease the consumption possibilities of future generations. In either
case, the current generation is a dictator to future generations, because the externalities of today’s
actions are faît à complis for the unborn future generations. In the absence of intergenerational
altruism, each generation will simply maximizes the own consumption without taking any of the
intergenerational externalities into account. While there has been no dispute concerning the
existence  of  intergenerational  altruism,  some  substantial  differences  have  appeared  in  the
literature concerning the structural details of intergenerational altruism. Yet, I am not aware of
any previous empirical or experimental work that has attempted to uncover the type of altruism
that governs intergenerational giving. This paper presents such an attempt.
Most contributions concerned with intergenerational altruism have followed Solow’s (1974)
concept of intergenerational equity that is based on Rawls’ (1971) maximin criterium. In
essence, the assumption is that preferences are governed by a desire to maximize the minimum
level of (expected) consumption across all generations. Although the idea is normatively quite
appealing
1,  a  number  of  authors  -  including  Solow  (1974)  himself  -  have  noted  that
intergenerational equity may prove to be too severe empirically.
2 There is, however, evidence
from experimental studies of single generation games indicating that people may have a strong3) The idea of a warm glow of giving has been mentioned by a number of authors in different contexts under
differing captions (e.g. “joy of giving” or “impure altruism”). The earliest references that I am aware of are Yaari
(1964) and Becker (1974). But, it is Andreoni (1988, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1995) who has made the most audible and
convincing case for warm glow altruism in a series of theoretical and experimental studies. 
4) There is also evidence from other experiments and from empirical work. The experiments of Bolton, Katok, and
Zwick (1998) and of Selten and Ockenfels (1998), for example, both show that donors keep the total amount of
altruistic “gifts” constant, independently of the distribution of the gifts to recipients and of the number of recipients.
Kingma (1989) and Thorpe and Phelps (1991) provide empirical evidence for warm glow altruism by showing that
private donations to charity are hardly crowded out by (tax financed) public subsidies.
5) The most notable contributions in this respect are Andreoni (1995) and Goeree, Holt, and Laury (2002). But
unfortunately, neither piece can really deliver a final answer to all the open questions.
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taste for equitable distributions of payoffs that may even be stricter than the maximin criterium
(Selten 1988; Ochs and Roth 1989; Bolton 1991; Andreoni and Miller 1993; Forsyth Güth 1995;
Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). In fact, in a number of experiments it has
been observed that subjects are willing to sacrifice substantial amounts of money to reduce (or
to prevent) inequality in payoffs (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996a; Slonim and Roth 1998;
Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2000; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Bosman and van Winden 2002).
Putting  the  preferences  for  distributional  equality  that  are  found  in  these  studies  into  the
perspective of the intergenerational setting, we might expect today’s generation not only to incur
a cost to increase the payoff of needier successors, but also to incur a cost to decrease the income
of wealthier successors. In both cases, there is a costly reduction of income inequality.
A widely acknowledged alternative to intergenerational equity is a concept often referred to as
the warm glow of giving. The idea is that an altruist derives utility from the mere act of giving
and not from the extent of increased utility (or consumption) of the recipients.
3 Hence, in contrast
to equity motivated behavior, warm glow altruism is insensitive to any comparisons of payoff (or
wealth) levels - be it comparing the donor to the recipient or be it comparing the recipients
amongst  each  other.  There  is  ample  experimental  support  for  the  warm  glow  hypothesis,
especially  in  single  generation  public  goods  games  (Andreoni  1993  and  1995;  Offerman,
Sonnemans, and Schram 1996; Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997).
4 
Although the evidence on equity and warm glow type preferences in single generation games
seems mixed, only very few attempts have been made to identify the features of the interaction
or the environment that may affect the relevance of the different types of preferences.
5 It seems
therefore difficult to anticipate whether equity or altruistic preferences will dominate decisions
in an  intergenerational setting. What complicates predictions even more are the structural6) In a companion paper (Fischer, Irlenbusch, Sadrieh 2002), we present an experiment with a similar inter-
generational setup, but with each generation being represented by three subjects, who play an intragenerational
common pool resource “stage game.” That more complicated game allows us to study the interaction of  intra- and
intergenerational effects. Here I’m only interested in studying the pure effects of intergenerational giving.
3
differences  that  set  the  intra-  and  intergenerational  approaches  apart.  While  in  the  single
generation setting, the care for others concerns a well-defined set of other individuals, whose
comfort or distress are immediately present, in the intragenerational setting the care for others
concerns  an  indefinite  number  of  individuals,  who  are  effected  in  the  future.  Thus,
intergenerational dynamics may create decisively different emotional and cognitive structures
than those found in single generation settings that have been examined so far. 
This paper presents an experiment that is designed to distinguish altruistic behavior consistent
with intergenerational equity from altruistic behavior consistent with the warm glow hypothesis.
The experimental setup is novel in that it solves the problem of installing an intergenerational
common pool resource game with generational chains of indefinite length. Each generation in the
chain is represented by a single subject, who decides how much to extract from the common pool
resource.
6 The more is extracted, the less is left for future generations. Hence, intergenerational
“giving”  in  the  context  of  the  experiment  means  extracting  less  than  a  monetary  payoff
maximizer would. 
Extraction behavior is compared across four treatments, that differ only in the “natural” growth
rate of the common pool resource. In the slow and the very slow growth treatments, the stock of
the resource diminishes (and is ultimately depleted), if every generation chooses the payoff
maximizing extraction level. In the fast and very fast growing treatments, the stock of the
resource increases, if every generation chooses the payoff maximizing extraction level. 
On the one hand, if subjects’ behavior is guided by the concern for intergenerational equity, then
we should observe extraction levels smaller than the payoff maximizing level (i.e. “inter-
generational gifts”) only in the slow treatments. In the fast treatments, however, subjects may
extract even more than prescribed by payoff maximization (i.e. they might waste resources), in
order to inhibit an inequitable growth of income to the future generations. On the other hand, if
subjects’ preferences corresponds to the warm glow of giving hypothesis, we should observe
intergenerational gifts in all slow and fast treatments. In fact, if altruism is a normal good, as the
experimental evidence found by Anderoni and Miller (2001) suggests, we should even expect7) Sugden (1984) presents a theory of reciprocal provision of public goods. Weimann (1994) checks for reciprocal
behavior in single generation public goods games and observes asymmetric behavior: Information on extremely low
cooperation leads to reciprocal responses, but information on extremely high cooperation does not. Heijden,
Nelissen, Potters, and Verbon (1998) check for the effect of social history on intergenerational transfers in an
overlapping generations experiment. Their setup and their research interest differs from ours in many ways. Most
importantly, they are interested in the consumption smoothing effects of intergenerational transfers from the “young”
to the “old” (as in public pension systems), while we are interested in the positive and negative intergenerational
externalities caused by actions of the “old” on the consumption opportunities of the “young” (as in R&D or
environmental issues). Because each generation in their experiment “lives” for two periods, there is room for
reputational and reciprocal effects connected to the social history. But, they do not find strong evidence of subjects’
transfer behavior being affected by intergenerational reputation and reciprocity.
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larger intergenerational gifts in the fast than in the slow growth treatments, since the average
income of subjects will tend to be higher in the fast compared to the slow growth treatments.
It is important to emphasize that the gifts are being given from one generation to the next, but not
exchanged between the generations. Like in the single generation dictator game introduced by
Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994), one party gives without the possibility of being
rewarded or being punished by the recipient. This setup allows us to single out the characteristics
of intergenerational altruism without having to worry about reputational or reciprocal effects.
7
Furthermore, even social history effects are avoided, because players are not informed on the
existence or extent of altruistic behavior exhibited by preceding generations. In this sense, the
experiment presented here is a straightforward extension of the single generation dictator game
to an intergenerational setting.
The experimental observations show little support for behavior guided by intergenerational
equity, but are well in line with the warm glow hypothesis. Most subjects fall into one of two
categories. About half of the subjects are non-altruistic and simply choose the strategy that is
dominant in monetary payoffs. The other half of the subjects exhibit intergenerational altruism
by sacrificing own payoff for the benefit of later generations. The behavior of the altruistic
subjects does not reveal a preference for intergenerational equity. In the slow growth settings, in
which income opportunities deteriorate from generation to generation, subjects’ sacrifices are not
sufficiently large to guarantee a constant stock of the common pool resource across generations.
Even altruistic subjects in these settings tend to deplete the resource more (i.e. enjoy more own
monetary payoff) than intergenerational equity prescribes. In the fast growth settings, in which
income opportunities expand from generation to generation, subjects’ do not destroy the inter-
generational resources in order to equalize payoff opportunities of today’s and tomorrow’s
generations. Instead, many subjects actually increase inequality across generations by sacrificing8) This type of behavior may be attributed to “efficiency motivation,” i.e. the willingness to incur a small cost in
exchange for a substantial increase in total welfare (Güth and Tietz 1990; Charness and Rabin 2002).
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(1)
some of their own income to the benefit of the future generations. They do so, knowing that this
decreases the payoff of the poorest generation (namely the own generation) and amplifies the
intergenerational inequality to the advantage of the future generations.
8 Thus, intergenerational
equity is neither supported in its weak form (maximin) nor in its strict form (constant stock).
But, there is support for warm glow altruism. The distribution of the amount of money sacrificed
by altruistic subjects is practically the same in all slow and fast growth settings. This means that
the observed altruistic intergenerational sacrifices are more or less independent of the neediness
of the future generations. This type of an invariance of the observed sacrifices to the welfare
effects of the gifts is a central feature of models of warm glow altruism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the intergenerational extraction
game is defined formally and the parameters and hypotheses are  presented. Then, a brief
description of the experimental procedure follows in section three. The results of the experiments
are presented in section four and section five concludes.
2. The Game, the Parameters, and the Hypotheses
In the intergenerational extraction game, each generation is represented by a single player, who
can choose to extract some part of an intergenerational common pool resource for the own
immediate consumption. The part of the resource that is not extracted grows and is then available
to the next generation. Let t  {1,...,T} denote a generation (a player), with T being the last
generation in the game. Let xt be the extraction level chosen by t. The action set is restricted to
15 extraction levels, i.e. xt  {1, ..., 15}. Let Ft be the resources available to the generation t.
(Since the resources are represented in monetary terms, Ft is often called the “funds” that are
available to t.) The payoff %t of t, given the extraction level xt and the funds Ft, is:
Player t achieves the maximum payoff (95 percent of the funds Ft) by choosing the mid-level
extraction xt = 8. For each step below or above this individually optimal choice there is 5 percent6
(2)
payoff reduction. The idea is that harvesting too little represents an immediate consumption loss,
while harvesting too much represents an indirect loss of consumption, due to the increasing
marginal cost of harvesting (e.g. it is never optimal to take every single fish out of the lake). Any
deviation from the individually optimal extraction level is costly to the current generation, but
the direction of deviation is crucial for the effect on the funds of the following generations. The
greater the chosen extraction level xt, the less funds are left for the next generations. 
Let g  [0,1] denote the “sensitivity” of the resource to extraction. Let c  {1, ..., 15} denote the
growth compensating extraction level, i.e. the level at which resource extraction just neutralizes
the natural resource growth. The funds Ft available to player t are then defined as follows:
If the chosen extraction level xt is greater than the growth compensating level c, the funds of the
next generation are reduced by g times the deviation from c. If the chosen extraction level xt is
smaller than the growth compensating level c, the funds of the next generation increase by g
times the deviation. Note that choosing any extraction level greater than the individually optimal
level (i.e. xt > 8) is pareto dominated by the choice of the individually optimal extraction level
(i.e. xt = 8), which leads both to a higher payoff for t and for the future generations. In other
words, extracting more of the resource than is individually optimal is a strictly wasteful activity
that can only be motivated by the desire to diminish future generations payoff opportunities,
perhaps in an attempt to equalize payoffs across generations.
Table 1 shows the four parameter sets used in the Very Slow, the Slow, the Fast, and the Very
Fast growth treatments of the experiment. The treatments vary in the sensitivity parameter g and
in the growth compensating extraction level c. In the two slow growth treatments, c is small and
well below the individually optimal extraction level. Thus, keeping the resource constant across
generations requires a very restrictive resource extraction in the slow treatments. In the two fast
treatments, c is large and well above the individually optimal extraction level. Hence, keeping
the resource constant across generations requires costly wasteful extraction in the fast treatments.
The sensitivity of the funds to extraction is also varied across treatments. The Very Slow and the
Very Fast treatments have a high sensitivity of g = .05 to extraction. This means that any7
deviation from the growth compensation level c has a 5 percent effect on the size of the funds.
Extracting one level less than the growth compensation level c leads to a 5 percent increase in the
funds, while extracting one level more leads to a 5 percent decrease in the funds. In the less
sensitive treatments, Slow and Fast, the changes in the funds are only at a rate of 2.5 percent for
each step of deviation from the growth compensating extraction level. 
Table 1. Treatments and Parameters






Very Slow .050 8 3
Slow .025 8 3
Fast .025 8 13
Very Fast .050 8 13
Table 2 displays the payoff and the growth effects of all possible choices for the four treatments.
Three things are worth noting. First, note that all payoff and growth effects are given in relative
terms, i.e. in percent of the current funds. This was also the case in the experiment (see the
decision sheet in the appendix). The subjects could easily calculate the absolute values. The size
of the own generation’s funds was displayed at the top of their decision sheets. Second, note that
the own payoff effect of an extraction level choice was exactly the same for subjects in all
treatments. The only difference between the treatments was the effect of the extraction level
choice on the funds of the future generations. Third, note that subjects in each treatment only
received the information on their own treatment. Every subject saw the column containing the
own payoff effects and only one of the four columns containing the growth effects.
If only monetary payoffs count, the game has a unique game theoretic solution. Each player has
a single strictly dominant strategy, namely choosing the individually optimal extraction level
xt = 8. This is true no matter how many generations have preceded and no matter how many will
follow. The dominant strategy argument leads to the following basic hypothesis.
H1 Behavior is consistent with monetary payoff maximization. Observed deviations of choices
from the individually optimal extraction level, xt = 8, are neither systematic nor substantial.8
Note that the interaction between generations only runs through the development of the funds
and is forward oriented, i.e. every player is a dictator to his successors. There are no reciprocity
or reputation effects across generations that could create monetary incentives to deviate from the
dominant strategy. Kindness cannot be returned and greed cannot be punished by future genera-
tions. Thus, not choosing the dominant strategy reveals a subject’s altruistic preference.
Table 2. Payoff and Growth Effects of Extraction Level Choices
extraction level payoffs in percent of the
available funds
change of the funds available to the next generation
Very Slow Slow Fast Very Fast
1 60% +10% +5.0% +30.0% +60%
2 65% +5% +2.5% +27.5% +55%
3 70% ±0% ±0% +25.0% +50%
4 75% 5% 2.5% +22.5% +45%
5 80% 10% 5.0% +20.0% +40%
6 85% 15% 7.5% +17.5% +35%
7 90% 20% 10.0% +15.0% +30%
8 95% 25% 12.5% +12.5% +25%
9 90% 30% 15.0% +10.0% +20%
10 85% 35% 17.5% +7.5% +15%
11 80% 40% 20.0% +5.0% +10%
12 75% 45% 22.5% +2.5% +5%
13 70% 50% 25.0% ±0% ±0%
14 65% 55% 27.5% 2.5% 5%
15 60% 60% 30.0% 5.0% 10%
If subjects deviate from the dominant strategy, due to their concern for future generations, then
their behavior may either be in line with (strict) growth compensation for achieving (strict)
intergenerational equity or with invariant sacrifices for receiving a warm glow of giving. Growth
compensation  prescribes  offsetting  the  natural  growth  of  the  funds  such  that  the  income
opportunities across generations are all above the minimum or in the strict version are all strictly
equalized. Growth compensation seems to be a straightforward intergenerational extension of the
single generational concept of distributional fairness.9) One Deutsche Mark was equivalent to .51 Euros and ca. $.49 at the time of the experiment.
10) There has been some debate on whether or not the double-blind procedure really results in less other-regarding
behavior or does not. A affirmative account is given in Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996). A critical report is
given by Bolton and Zwick (1995), who find no evidence supporting the social distance hypothesis.
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H2 Behavior is consistent with (strict) intergenerational equity. Observed choices deviate
neither systematically nor substantially from the (strict) growth compensating extraction
levels, i.e. xt = 3 in Very Slow and Slow and xt = 8 (xt = 13) in Fast and Very Fast.
Alternatively, if behavior is in line with the invariant sacrifices concept, then the observed
deviations from the dominant strategy should be independent of the treatment (after correcting
for income effects). Subjects motivated by a warm glow of giving only care to give, but do not
care about the magnitude of the positive effects of their gifts. More specifically, deviations from
the individually optimal extraction level are expected to be towards less extraction (i.e. altruistic)
in all treatments, even though this means that the future generations in the Fast and Very Fast
treatments will have dramatically better income opportunities than the current generation. 
H3 Behavior is consistent with warm glow altruism. Observed choices are skewed to levels
below the individually optimal extraction level (xt < 8) in all treatments. The distributions
of sacrifices show neither systematic nor substantial differences across treatments.
3. Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the cafeteria of the University of Bonn. Students walking in
and out were encouraged to participate. Participation was restricted to one instance only. A total
of 117 subjects took part in the experiment; about 30 per treatment. Subjects on average spent 15
minutes for the entire procedure. Average earnings were 12.54 Deutsche Marks.
9 The experiment
in total took 3 - 4 hours. The procedure used was “double-blind,” as in Hoffman, McCabe,
Shachat, and Smith (1994).
10 Subjects were aware of the fact that, although all decisions were
recorded, decisions could not be traced back to the person who had made them.
Each subject received instructions after being seated in one of the four “cubicals” that were set
up in the cafeteria by placing wooden dividers on four desks. The subject was told to study the
instruction sheet and the decision sheet (see the appendix) carefully. Questions were answered.
Once the subject had asserted having understood the decision problem and the procedure, he/she10
was left alone to make the decision. After the subject had made his/her decision, he/she folded
the decision sheet and left the cubical for the cashier’s box. There, the subject slipped his/her
decision sheet through a small slit into the box. The cashier, who was sitting inside the box (also
a cubical) and who could not see the subject, passed a “General Participation Form” (see the
appendix) to the subject. This was signed by the subject with his/her actual name. The subject
dropped the signed participation form into a sealed urn. On the participation sheet the subject
declared having taken part in an experiment, having received cash, and having signed a receipt
with a code name. The 26 code names with which subjects could sign the receipts were posted
at the cashier' s box and also indicated on the general participation form. Subjects were free to
choose any one of these for signing the receipt. This procedure was required by the university’s
accounting officers.
The subjects  were  informed that the number of generations was fixed and limited. They,
however, neither knew the number of generations, nor did they know which position they had in
the generational chain. Towards the end of the experiment subjects could have noticed that the
number of new recruits was dropping. The very last four subjects, in fact, could see that the
cubicles were no longer being used. To avoid difficulties with uncontrolled effects concerning
the last generations of subjects, the last 18 subjects are completely omitted from the analysis. 
This leaves us with 99 subjects (43 females and 56 males); 24 subjects in the Very Slow
treatment and 25 in each of the other treatments. The experimental protocol was fixed for 5
chains of 5 generations (subjects) to be used for each treatment and 1 chain to be disposed of.
One of the chains in the Very Fast treatment was mistakenly stopped after 4 generations. In the
Fast treatment a mistake led to a chain with 6 generations and a chain of only 4 generations. 
The actual length of the generational chain, however, cannot have affected behavior, since
subjects were neither informed of the length of the chains nor of their position therein. They
received no information on pervious choices or the history of the funds. The only piece of
information that was not identical for all subjects in a treatment was the current size of the funds.
However, since subjects were not informed of the initial size of the funds with which a chain
started, it was impossible for them to derive any information their position from the size of the
funds they faced. Furthermore, the initial size of the funds was set to 9.20, to ensure that the11
subjects at the beginning of a chain would not be able to infer their position from the fact that
size of their funds coincided with a “round” number such as a 10.
4. Results
The first important result of the experiment is that intergenerational altruism affects behavior,
even in the absence of reciprocity. Table 3 shows average deviations of observed from the
individually optimal extraction level and the number of subjects deviating in each treatment. The
average extraction level is lower than the individually optimal (payoff maximizing) level xt = 8
in all four treatments. Thus, more resources are left to future generations than predicted by the
game theoretic equilibrium of the game with non-altruistic players.
However, although the average behavior is altruistic, table 3 also reveals that roughly one half of
the subjects simply maximize the monetary payoffs. Thus, the evidence concerning hypothesis
H1 is mixed: Payoff maximization does explain the behavior of almost half of the subjects, but
substantial and systematic deviations from payoff maximizing behavior are observed in the
behavior of a majority of subjects.
Table 3. Deviations from the Individually Optimal Extraction Level
treatment average deviation of the observed
extraction levels from x = 8 number of subjects deviating
Very Slow 3.12 16 (64%)
Slow 1.92 13 (52%)
Fast 1.48 11 (44%)
Very Fast 1.04 13 (54%)
The impression that the deviations from the payoff maximizing behavior are systematic, with
extraction level choices being lower than individually optimal, proves to be correct. Figure 1
displays the distribution of extraction level choices in all treatments. The vast majority of
deviating subjects chooses an extraction level that is below the payoff maximizing extraction
level (i.e. xt < 8), i.e. subjects exhibit intergenerational altruism. Only 4 of the 53 deviating
subjects choose extraction levels greater than the payoff maximizing level (i.e. xt > 8). Three of
the four are in the fast growing treatments, in which growth compensation can be evidence for11) Note that subjects in other experiments do choose pareto dominated outcomes. In the ultimatum game, for
example, many responders reject positive offers of proposers. Since such a rejection leads to the destruction of the
entire cake in that game, both the responder and the proposer incur a loss (Güth, Schmittberger, Schwarze 1982;
Ochs and Roth 1989; Güth 1995). This phenomenon is also known in other games (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith
1996a; Slonim and Roth 1998; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2000; Bolton and Ockenfels
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Figure 1. Distribution of Extraction Level Choices
strict  intergenerational  equity.  Only  one  subject,  however,  chooses  exactly  the  growth
compensating extraction level of xt  = 13. 
Remember that hypothesis H2 predicts that subjects will try to equalize intergenerational income
opportunities by choosing the growth compensating extraction levels xt = 3 in the slow and
xt = 8 (or xt = 13 for the strict equality case) in the fast treatments. Obviously, there is no support
whatsoever for the strict version of hypothesis H2 in the fast treatments, in which the growth
compensation outcome is strictly pareto dominated.
11 But, there is also little support for the
weaker version of H2, since about one half of the subjects in the fast growth treatments sacrifice
own payoff to increase the future generations’ payoff by choosing extraction levels below the
payoff maximizing level, i.e. choosing xt < 8. In the slow treatments, 8 of 50 subjects choose13
xt = 3 (i.e. 16 percent of all subject and 27.6 percent of the deviating subjects). These numbers
do not provide much support for growth compensation either. All in all, it seems quite clear that
there is basically no evidence in support of the intergenerational equity hypothesis H2. 
The average deviations from payoff maximizing behavior - shown in table 3 - suggest that the
faster the resource growth is, the lower is the average deviation of the observed extraction levels
from  payoff  maximization.  Notice,  however,  that  no  such  correlation  can  be  found  when
comparing  the  counts  of  deviating  subjects  across  treatments.  Also,  the  extraction  level
distributions displayed in figure 1 do not show strong differences across treatments. The only
exception is the Very Slow treatment, in which more subjects exhibit strong negative deviations
from payoff maximization than in the other three treatments. Comparing extraction level choices
across every pairing of treatments with the Mann-Whitney U-test, we finds the extraction levels
in Very Slow to be lower than those in any of the other treatments (the differences are significant
in the comparisons with the two fast treatments at  =.05, two-tailed, and weakly significant in
the comparison with the Slow treatment at  =.20, two-tailed). No other comparison reveals a
significant difference. Thus, although there seems to be some evidence for an increased care for
the future when the growth is very slow, a strong systematic effect all across treatments cannot
be found.
The warm glow hypothesis H3 predicts that altruistic behavior will be observed in all treatments
and that the distribution of altruism is invariant to the treatment (i.e. to the neediness of the
future generations). As shown above, the first statement of the hypothesis H3 is clearly supported
by the observed data. There is a substantial amount of altruism observed in all treatments. The
treatment differences in the distribution of extraction levels, however, seem to contradict the
warm glow hypothesis on first sight. However, the question is whether the extraction level per
se is the right measure of altruism. Note that the same extraction level choice can lead to very
different payoff consequences, depending on the treatment and the current size of the funds.
Hence, it seems that the altruistic sacrifice, i.e. the payoff disadvantage of the chosen extraction
level compared to the non-altruistic benchmark, presents a better measuring for the extent of
intergenerational altruism in this game.
Table 4 shows the average sacrifices of altruistic subjects in the four treatments. The average
altruistic sacrifices are displayed both in absolute monetary terms and relative to the size of the14
current generation’s funds. The monotonously falling sequence of average relative sacrifices
seems to indicate a positive correlation of observed relative sacrifices and the neediness of future
generations. This hypothesis is support only partially by the observations. Relative sacrifices in
the Very Slow treatment are significantly greater than in the Very Fast treatment (U-Test,  =.05,
two-tailed), but not greater than in either of the other two treatments. Furthermore, there is the
weakly significant effect (U-Test,  =.20, two-tailed) of the relative sacrifices in the Slow
treatment being greater than in the Very Fast treatment.
Table 4. Altruistic Sacrifices
treatment
average altruistic sacrifice





Very Slow 24%   (8) 1.86  (0.73)
Slow 22%  (10) 1.73  (0.81)
Fast 19%  (12) 2.54  (1.69)
Very Fast 15%  (11) 2.10  (1.26)
While there are signs that subjects’ relative sacrifices decrease as the income opportunities of
future generations go up, the average absolute sacrifices does not seem to  exhibit such a
correlation. The average absolute sacrifices of the altruistic subjects displayed in table 5 are
smaller in the two slow treatments than in the two fast treatments. Statistical tests, however,
reveal that no significant differences can be detected concerning the extent of altruistic sacrifices
in absolute terms (no pairwise U-Tests is significant - not even at  =.20, two-tailed). 
The results of the non-parametric analysis are confirmed by a simple linear regression analysis.
Table  5  displays  the  coefficients,  standard  errors,  t-values,  error  probabilities,  and  95%
confidence intervals when using a simple OLS to regress the absolute sacrifice of each subject
on the size of funds available to the subject, the treatment dummies (where the very slow
treatment is the omitted default case), and the gender. The t-values leave no doubt that the
altruistic sacrifice in absolute terms is neither affected by the size of the funds, nor by any of the
treatments,  nor  by  the  gender  of  the  subject.  Only  the  regression  constant  is  significant,
indicating that subjects on average sacrifice about 1.78 Deutsche Mark (somewhat less than one
Euro or one US Dollar) no matter how much endowment was available and no matter how fast
it grew from one generation to the next. 15
Table 5. Absolute Altruistic Sacrifice as a Function of Funds Size, Treatment Indicators, and Gender
simple OLS coefficient std. error t p > | t | 95% confidence interval
constant -1.776894 .5478389 -3.24 0.002 -2.881716 -.6720714
funds -.0108129 .0622189 -0.17 0.863 -.1362892 .1146634
slow .1300862 .460005 0.28 0.779 -.7976023 1.057775
fast -.6111678 .6202155 -0.99 0.330 -1.861952 .639616
very fast -.1447732 .693657 -0.21 0.836 -1.543666 1.25412
male -.002636 .3605251 -0.01 0.994 -.7297042 .7244322
Thus, the absolute altruistic sacrifice can be considered as the one measure of intergenerational
altruism that is invariant to the treatment parameters. This observation seems perfectly in line
with the warm glow hypothesis H3, because the extent of subjects’ altruism seems unaffected by
the extend of later generations’ neediness. 
Since the absolute income level of subjects is higher the faster the resource grows, one possible
explanation for the decreasing relative sacrifices is that the warm glow of the altruistic sacrifices
enters subjects’ utility functions as an inferior good. Hence, as income increases the part of the
budget spent on intergenerational altruism decreases, while the absolute level of expenditure
remains almost unchanged across treatments. Evidence in support of this interpretation comes
from a rank correlation analysis of the altruistic subjects’ behavior across all treatments. The
Spearman rank correlation coefficient relating relative altruistic sacrifices to the size of the
available funds is negative (-.32) and significant ( = .05, two-tailed).  Thus, the greater the
funds that are available to a subject, the smaller the altruistic sacrifice in relative terms. The size
of altruistic sacrifices in absolute terms, however, is not correlated to the size of the available
funds. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient in that case is close to zero and not significant.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Many  activities  of  the  current  generation  entail  positive  or  negative  externalities  for  the
generations to come. There is no dispute in the literature that individuals are the willing to
sacrifice some of their current consumption to the advantage of their successors. The structure
of this intergenerational altruism, however, has not been throughly studied yet. This paper
presents a first experimental inquiry into that issue. 16
Two prime candidates for the structure of intergenerational altruism have emerged from the
theoretical literature and from previous experimental observations in single generation games.
One possibility is that altruistic behavior in intergenerational interaction is equity motivated, i.e.
aimed  at  sustaining  minimum  payoff  across  all  generations.  Equity  is  not  only  the  most
frequently used theoretical concept, but there is also support for equity motivated behavior from
experimental work on some single generation games. The second candidate considered is warm
glow altruism, which assumes that individuals enjoy the mere act of giving without taking the
extent of the positive external effects of their gifts into account. This concept has also found
experimental support in single generation experiments, especially experiments on the voluntary
provision of public goods. 
The  multi-generational  experiment  presented  here  discriminates  between  the  two  types  of
altruism by varying the growth rate of the intergenerational common pool resource. Equity
models predict intergenerational sacrifices only in the slow growth treatments in which resource
growth is too slow to guarantee intergenerational sustainability with non-altruistic players. In
contrast,  warm  glow  models  predict  intergenerational  sacrifices  both  in  the  slow  growth
treatments and in the fast growth treatments in which resource growth is faster than is required
for a sustainable resource exploitation of non-altruistic players. 
We observe that in every treatment about half of the subjects non-altruistically maximize their
own payoffs, while the others deviate towards altruistic restraint in resource extraction. This
means that there is no support for equity motivated altruism, which would have resulted in
extraction restraint only in the slow growth treatments. Instead, observed behavior seems well in
line with the predictions of the warm glow hypothesis. While altruistic sacrifices in relative terms
fall as income rises, indicating that warm glow may be an inferior good, the distributions of
altruistic sacrifices in absolute terms are statistically indistinguishable across all income levels
and treatments. On average, altruistic subjects sacrifice roughly two Deutsche Marks (ca. one US
Dollar) in order to increase the income opportunities of future generations. They do so no matter
whether the successors are better off or worse off than they are themselves.
The  implications  of  these  results  are  two-fold.  First,  the  results  suggest  that  the  standard
approach to intergenerational issues in economic theory should be reconsidered. The lack of
behavioral evidence in support of intergenerational equity suggests that it may be worthwhile to17
rethink a substantial part of the theoretical work on intergenerational resource use in which the
“optimal” intergenerational allocation is based on the concept intergenerational equity. Here a
number of new theoretical results and empirical implications may be derived from a new
framework based on warm glow altruism.
The second implication of the results is practical. Since the magnitude of altruistic sacrifices to
the benefit of future generations seems basically unaffected by the income possibilities of the
future generations, there is reason to believe that public subsidies (mandatory contributions)
towards endangered resources will not crowd out the voluntary contributions. This is good news,
because it implies that sustainable resource development might be achieved by complementing
the individual voluntary altruistic efforts with government action that is more intensive, the more
dramatic the decline of the resource is.18
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Instructions for the Experiment
General Situation
In addition to you, there are others participating in this experiment.
A group of participants forms a chain.
Each chain consists of a first participant, a last participant, and an undisclosed number of participants in between.
None of the participants knows, which position he or she has in the chain.
There are many such chains in the experiment, so that it is certain that all participants, who are currently at the
decision stand, are assigned to different chains.
Funds
Each participant’s earning potential depends on the amount of funds available to him or her.
A specific amount of funds is made available to the first participant of each chain.
The amount of funds available to each of the next participants in a chain depends on the decision of all preceding
participants in that chain, i.e. it can vary from participant to participant in a chain.
The decision situation is identical for all participants in a chain, except for the possibly different amounts of
funds that are available.
The amount of funds available to you is indicated on the top of your decision sheet.
Decision Situation
Each participant is to choose one of the 15 options: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, or O.
Each option has two consequences:
1. one for the own payoff, which increases from A to H and then decreases again from H to O;
2. one for the funds of the following participant in the chain - and thus, for the payoffs of all following
participants in the chain -, with A having the most and O having the least beneficial consequence for the
funds of the following participant in the chain.
The extent of these two consequences is indicated in the table on the decision sheet:
In the first column, My Decision, each of the options A to O, of which you are to choose one by marking it
with a cross, is displayed in one line.
In each line of the second column, My Payoff, the payoff you achieve with the corresponding option is
displayed as a percentage of the funds available to you.
In each line of the third column, Change of the Funds Available to the Following Participant of the
Chain, the displayed figure indicates by how many percent the funds available to the following participant
will rise (if a "+" is displayed) or will fall (if a "-" is displayed), if you choose the corresponding option.
(A "± 0%" indicates that the choice of this option leads to no change of the funds available to the
following participant.)
Anonymity and Payment
To ensure perfect anonymity of your decision, please follow these directions:
1. Draw a closed envelope with a decision sheet.
2. Take a seat in a free cubicle and make your decision there.
3. You may indicate your gender and your field of study in the voluntary information part on the bottom of
the decision sheet. (But, please, do not disclose any other personal information!)
4. Proceed to the cashier's box and slide your decision sheet under the slit into the box.
(The cashier cannot see you.)
5. Sign the general participation form, that is passed to you by the cashier and drop it into the box in front of
the cashier's box that is marked correspondingly.
6. Choose one - whichever you want - of the 26 code names displayed at the cashier's box and sign the
receipt passed to you by the cashier with the chosen code name.
7. Collect your payoff.
Thank you for participating!Decision Sheet
(This is the decision sheet for the Very Slow treatment. The others were identical except for the numbers in the last column.)
   Funds in DM
my decision
(Please, mark only one letter!)
my payoff
(in percent of the funds)
change (in percent) of the funds for
the next participant in the chain
 A 60% +10%
 B 65% +5%
 C 70% ±0%
 D 75% 5%
 E 80% 10%
 F 85% 15%
 G 90% 20%
 H 95% 25%
 I 90% 30%
 J 85% 35%
 K 80% 40%
 L 75% 45%
 M 70% 50%
 N 65% 55%
 O 60% 60%
Please, mark your choice in the table above.
Next, indicate your gender and your field of study in the table below.
Please, fold this sheet and proceed to the cashier's box.
Information on Gender and Field of Study
This information is only used for the purpose of statistical analyses.
The information will not affect your payoff.
Gender  male  female
Field of Study
Number of Semesters
Have taken the course "Game Theory"  yes  no  don't know
(The following general participation form had to be signed and dropped by every participant after having received the
payoff and having signed the receipt of the payoff anonymously.)
I herewith declare that I have participated in an experiment of the Laboratorium für experimentelle
Wirtschaftsforschung on May 18, 1998. Due to my participation, I received a payment for which I signed a
receipt with one of the following names:
Agen, Bale, Camo, Dabo, Ehus, Faro, Gent, Hova, Imon, Jult, Kaja, Lina, Marn, Nesu, Oden, Poku, Quar,
Renk, Salo, Tamo, Ubis, Veku, Wika, Xedi, Yabo, Zoba.
Please sign this form with your own name and drop it into the urn next to the cashier's box.
Bonn, May 18, 1998 ________________________________